Standardization of complex products is widely touted as improving consumer decisions and intensifying price competition, but evidence on standardization's e¤ect is limited. We examine a natural experiment: the standardization of health insurance plans on the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange. Pre-standardization, …rms had wide latitude to design contracts, which were then grouped into tiers of quality.
Introduction
E¤ective markets rely on consumers making informed choices. Yet in many contexts, consumers face di¢ cult, complex choices: they may not understand the product itself, they may have di¢ culty comparing di¤erent products (Kling et al. 2011) , they may be overwhelmed by large choice sets (Iyengar and Lepper 2000) 1 , and they may be unable to observe important dimensions of product quality. Market makers and regulators often seek to help consumers with "choice architecture". For example, policy-makers may require …rms to disclose certain types of information about their products (e.g. gas mileage on cars; see Dranove and Jin 2010) as well as creating certi…cation schemes that indicate whether a product has met minimal levels of quality (e.g. Leslie and Jin 2003 on restaurant quality, Houde 2013 on energy e¢ ciency). Relatedly, policy-makers may "nudge" consumers into making di¤erent (potentially better) choices, for instance by changing how information is presented, what the default option is, or other aspects of the decision interface (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2009) . Providing clear, transparent information or simplifying a choice menu is often seen as a benign nudge that can improve market outcomes.
We examine product standardization, a choice architecture intervention designed to both improve consumer choice and increase competitive pressures on …rms. When products vary across many dimensions, consumers may not be able to identify which dimensions are most important, may not pay attention to certain characteristics (Lacetera, Pope, and Sydnor 2012) and therefore may not be able to rank products based on quality. Standardization entails de…ning dimensions on which products cannot vary, and could entail limiting …rms to a single "standard product" or a set of standardized products. Policy-makers makers hope standardization will facilitate comparisons across types of products, improving consumer matching by making quality easier to observe. Moreover, policy-makers hope standardization will facilitate comparison shopping within a type of product, reducing product di¤erentiation and thereby reducing …rms'markups over cost. Despite the promise of standardization, there Part D).
To analyze the impact of standardization on choice we …rst show reduced form evidence that it had a substantial e¤ect on brand and characteristics of plan chosen: consumers who enroll just before and just after the change look similar, but make di¤erent choices. There are two potential sources of this shift: an "availability" and a "valuation" e¤ect. For availability, choices could change because the mix of products available changed and the utility-maximizing choice may di¤er between the old and new choice sets. Alternatively, standardization could have changed how consumers value plan attributes, either by changing understanding of product attributes or because preferences are choice-set dependent (Tversky and Simonson 1993) . With the valuation e¤ect, there is a change in the decision weights individuals use to make their choice (arguments of the "decision utility function," in the language of Kahneman, Wakker, and Sarin 1997 5 ), which simply means that the weights on attributes that rationalize observed choices di¤er. The decision utility function can be in ‡uenced by both elements of the product that are directly relevant for consumer welfare, as well as by aspects of the decision-making process-for instance, the use of heuristics (see Ericson and Starc 2012) .
To distinguish between the availability and valuation e¤ects, we estimate a discrete choice model in which decision weights on various insurance attributes (deductible, brand, etc.) are allowed to vary pre-and post-standardization. We …nd that decision weights di¤er significantly pre-and post-standardization. The di¤erential decision weights can be interpreted as changes in information, attention (DellaVigna 2009) or salience (Bordalo and Shleifer 2012); relatedly, consumers may perceive implicit recommendations contained in the design of choice set (contextual inference; see Kamenica 2008) . The …nding of di¤erent decision weights pre-and post-standardization contributes to a literature that …nds important e¤ects of context on preferences.
We use our discrete choice estimates to break down the total e¤ect of standardization into components. Because standardization changes how consumers choose among products, it will also change how …rms optimally set prices. We examine how …rm markups over cost change as a result of standardization. To do so, we run counterfactuals that examine the equilibrium policy implications of standardization. We examine how choices are a¤ected by both the change in decision weights as well as …rm decisions (e.g.how many more consumers would have chosen a high deductible health plan (HDHP) in the absence of a …rm price response.) We …nd that the change in the choice set (and associated change in decision weights) is responsible for most of the shift in choices, rather than changes in …rm pricing.
In practice, standardization of products entails two changes: an actual change in the choice menu, as well as changes to the decision interface (e.g. simpli…cations enabled by standardization). While both types of changes are relevant for estimating the policy-relevant e¤ect of standardization, it can be valuable to disentangle these two sources of standardization's e¤ect in order to make predictions for other contexts. To separate these e¤ects, we conduct an experiment in which participants make hypothetical insurance choices from from menus and choice interfaces that replicate the HIX's pre-and post-standardization menu, as well as a new counterfactual condition. Our experimental design replicates the e¤ect of standardization on choice: although baseline choices di¤er between experiment participants and HIX enrollees, the HIX's three major shifts from standardization (away from HDHP and among brands) are also found in the experiment. This supports the validity of our research design on the HIX: standardization itself, rather than a shift in the composition of enrollees, explains the results. 6 We run a third condition to dissociate the e¤ect of the choice menu change from the choice interface: in this treatment, participants see the post-standardization choice menu using the pre-standardization choice interface. The results show that both the choice interface and menu have e¤ects on choice, and that choices would have been di¤erent if standardization had not been accompanied by a change to the decision interface. Moreover, we …nd that the interface induces shifts in the reported importance of plan attributes, but not the choice menu itself.
Finally, we examine the policy's e¤ect on consumer surplus. Welfare evaluation in the presence of choice inconsistencies is controversial (see Bernheim and Rangel 2011, Beshears et al. 2008) . We evaluate standardization's e¤ect on welfare using two di¤erent welfare criteria: the estimated utility function pre-standardization, and the estimated utility function post-standardization. While the two criteria give di¤erent magnitudes of the e¤ect of standardization, both agree that standardization increased welfare. However, …rm reoptimization of prices harms consumers.
Behavioral biases, as well as nudges or choice architectures meant to counter these biases, are often evaluated in a partial equilibrium setting in which only consumers choices change. However, as noted by Grubb (2009) and Handel (2013) , …rms are likely to respond to both behavioral biases and nudges as well. Our unique context allows us to explore both demandand supply-side reactions to the policy change; perhaps unsurprisingly, we …nd a role for both in our consumer welfare calculations. A study that examined consumer choices in isolation would overstate that value of the policy intervention. Therefore, we argue that our approach provides additional context for policy-makers considering nudges.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Massachusetts Connector and the policy change. Section 3 describes the data and provides reduced form evidence of the impact of standardization. Section 4 outlines the empirical model and presents the structural estimates. Section 5 conducts counterfactual analyses and describes the hypothetical choice experiment. Section 6 concludes.
The Massachusetts HIX

History and Existing Literature
The Massachusetts'HIX was established by the 2006 Massachusetts health reform. The HIX we examine is an unsubsidized health insurance exchange (termed "Commonwealth Choice") for individuals and families making over 300% of the poverty line who were not o¤ered employer-sponsored insurance; a separate, subsidized program serves individuals under 300% of the poverty line. In the time frame we analyze (2009) (2010) , the exchange had been operating for 2 years, and was highly regulated by the Connector Authority. Eventually, it will transition to being an ACA exchange, with slightly di¤erent regulation. See Ericson and Starc (2013) for more detail on the exchange. Previous work on the Massachusetts HIX has modeled consumer demand (Ericson and Starc 2012a), and pricing regulation in the presence of imperfect competition (Ericson and Starc 2012b).
Consumers purchasing an exchange plan can choose a plan through an internet portal or by phone; most enroll through the Connector's website. On the website, consumers input demographic information that a¤ects pricing and then are able to compare various plans. Our earlier work (Ericson and Starc 2012a) indicates that the content and display of information on the website has important implications for consumer choice. In this paper, we examine a policy that both altered the plans available and the display of information in the marketplace. Screenshots that show the choice interface both pre-and post-standardization are available in the appendix.
Plan Standardization
States have a great deal of latitude in designing exchanges, including plan design. However, throughout its existence, the Massachusetts HIX has taken an active approach. Initially, a number of tiers were de…ned (bronze, silver, gold) by actuarial value, in a model that was subsequently duplicated by the A¤ordable Care Act. The Connector required insurers to o¤er a minimum number of products (six, distributed across tiers) and awarded a seal of approval only to selected providers (cite: Toolkit Series). This system evolved over time to a situation in late 2009 in which 25 distinct plans were o¤ered by one of 6 carriers: Blue Cross Blue Shield, Neighborhood Health Plan, Tufts, Health New England, Harvard Pilgrim, and Fallon. Interest in standardizing the plans grew out consumer feedback, as consumers were confused by the existing choice architecture. Board members further saw this as an opportunity to improve choice, stating that "consumers don't have to worry that there's some sort of 'gotcha'in the health insurance purchase. They can know that they are comparing equivalent products and so make better informed decisions based on premium and provider di¤erences". 7 However, this left board members with a di¢ cult choice of how to standardize the products; rather than relying on competitive pressure forcing insurers to o¤er the products demand by consumers, the decision would suddenly be top-down. Furthermore, the Connector had little research to guide their decision, and relied heavily on common sense. 8 The initial standardization led to the creation of seven product categories: Gold, Silver-High, Medium and Low, and Bronze-High, Medium, and Low. The plans were initially offered by the same set of six insurers; in addition, Fallon began o¤ering plans with tiered/limited networks. As a result, while standardization lowered the number of contract designs (…nancial parameters) used in the market, it actually increased the number of plans, in the sense of contract design-carrier combinations. Crucially, standardization also unbundled the decision making process into a decision about a contract design, followed by a decision about an insurer, as seen below in Figure 1 . The standardization process is an ongoing one; the silver medium plan has been eliminated due to low demand and additional insurers have been added.
Our paper is most closely related to two ideas within the empirical industrial organization literature. The …rst concerns costly consumer search, which can lead to equilibrium dispersion in prices for even homogeneous goods. Various studies, including Cebul et al (2011) and Hortascu and Syverson (2004) use this equilibrium dispersion in prices to trace out a distribution of search costs. This literature has primarily focused on homogenous goods markets, though the search problem is almost certainly exacerbated by product di¤erentiation, which implies that consumers must search over a variety of product characteristics, in addition to price. By contrast, the marketing literature has considered the possibility that not all products enter the choice set, and instead allows for consideration sets (cite). Finally, within the health context, Sorenson (2000) considers the role of price posting regu-7 lation in driving the equilibrium distribution of prices of prescription drugs. This last paper illustrates and import point: information disclosure can lead to increased price competition.
Our paper is also related to the literature studying the impact of information provision on market outcomes. Sorenson (2000) considers the role of information in a¤ecting prices. Jin and Leslie (2003) consider the impact of posting restaurant report cards, …nding that increased disclosure can improve quality, and Bollinger, Leslie and Sorenson (2010) …nd that posting calorie counts reduces calories consumed (see also Abaluck 2011). Again, within the health setting, Dafny and Dranove (2005) show that health plan report cards do "tell consumers something they don't know" and increase enrollment beyond the role of marketbased information, and Jin and Sorenson (2006) …nd that plan ratings have a meaningful e¤ect on quality of health plan chosen.
Data and Reduced-Form Evidence
Our dataset is transaction-level data (purchase, cancellation, and payments) from the unsubsidized market (Commonwealth Choice) from the beginning of the Connector's existence in July 2007 until July 2010 (with additional data to be added). We observe approximately 50,000 transactions. There are large spikes in initial enrollment during the …rst month of the Connector's existence as well as just before the individual mandate took e¤ect in December 2007, with a steady-state enrollment of approximately one thousand households per month.
Our choice analyses focuses on a subset of the data: Nov. 2009-Feb. 2010. Because we observe transaction-level data, we do not observe all the plan prices that individuals face. However, for the subsample, we collected an extensive set of price quotes from the Connector website using a Perl script. The choice of sample period does not have a strong e¤ect on the results, and we show the robustness of our results to various sample selections.
First, we provide basic summary statistics in Table 1 . Bronze plans are popular during both time periods, though they are slightly more popular in the earlier period. The shift in enrollment from bronze plans is absorbed by silver plans. Interestingly, there is a big decrease in the number of consumers who choose high deductible plans (de…ned as in the tax code as plans with at least a $1200 individual deductible 9 ): over half of all enrollees choose high-deductible plans in 2009, while just over one-fourth choose high-deductible plans in 2010. The relative marketshare of insurers also changes substantially post-standardization: Neighborhood Health Plan sees the largest increase, mirrored by Fallon's decrease. We investigate time trends in preference over this four month time period (controlling for pre-v. post-standardization), and …nd no evidence of any signi…cant trends in tier or brand chosen (see Figure A .1 and Table A .1).
To examine the e¤ect of the standardization on prices, we present a series of hedonic regressions in 2. Unadjusted for generosity, plans are slightly cheaper in 2010. However, column 2 shows that this is largely because more lower generosity (bronze and silver) plans were available in 2010. If anything, plans became slightly more expensive, adjusted for …nancial generosity, in 2010. However, columns 3 and 4 show that this e¤ect is not uniform across plan types. Less generous tiers become relatively more expensive, while the cost savings associated with choosing a HDHP are lower in 2010. Therefore, we should expect consumers to choose more generous plans in 2010 given the price change. We will use this model to predict alternative prices when performing counterfactual exercises.
Standardization and Decision Weights
We estimate a discrete choice model of demand for products in which 1) we model the utility of insurance plans as a function of their characteristics and 2) allow the weight on these characteristics to di¤er pre-and post-standardization. Estimating separate decision weights pre-and post-standardization allow us to model how demand di¤ers post-standardization; these demand estimates can then be used to make inference about optimal …rm response.
In this section, we remain agnostic about why the decision weights change post-standardization, but discuss and test among the alternatives in subsequent sections. Decision weights can result from context-dependent inference (Kamenica 2009), context-dependent salience (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2012), or from attention in the way information is presented (DellaVigna 2009).
Model of Consumer Choice
We model the consumer choice as a discrete choice problem. The motivation for doing so is two-fold. First, consumers face a large choice set, and forming expectations over outcomes for such as large choice set without claims data is likely to be extremely challenging. Our question examines the relative weight consumers place on product characteristics and how this is impacted by product standardization and information presentation. Therefore, a discrete choice approach is natural, in addition to being practical. In the model, consumers face discrete choice from a set of plans, and value various plan characteristics; the mean value of a plan will be denoted by j and the individual-speci…c component will be denoted by ij . Initially, we assume that consumer i's decision utility of plan j is given by:
where " ij is an error term that i.i.d extreme value. Consumer's (welfare-relevant) utility may deviate from the decision index, due to the decision process (see also Ericson and Starc 2012). We model both utility and salience of product characteristics and use a conditional logit speci…cation to estimate consumer demand for insurance plans. We assume the consumer chooses the plan with the largest decision index. Given the assumption that " ij is i.i.d. extreme value, this implies that a plan's enrollment share can be written as:
where s ij represents the probability that consumer i purchases product j. 10 The decision index depends on decision weights, which we assume are related to-but not necessarily identical to-the underlying utility of the product. Hence, if the mean (welfarerelevant) utility of the product is given by j = X j in the standard model, we allow the decision index in a particular context f to be jjf = X j f : the vector represents the primitive preference and the vector f represents the relative weight these characteristics are given in the decision under of the product characteristics. The context f that alters decisionweights can be a function of the way information is presented, the product's position in the choice set, or any "ancillary condition" in the language of Bernheim and Rangel (2011).
We allow decision weights to vary by estimating a decision utility function in which both primative preferences and "ancillary conditions" a¤ect choice. Let ijt be the consumer decision index for consumer i and product j in time period/market t. We de…ne the decision index as:
allowing for separate changes in weights on all the elements in X j : premiums, indicators for tier and HDHP (the key …nancial characteristics), and insurer brand. If the observed change in choices is solely due to the change in what is o¤ered, = 0; non-zero values of indicate that decision weights shifted as a result of standardization.
Our speci…cation allows market shares to depend on both primative preferences and "ancillary conditions". In counterfactual exercises, we will vary decision weights, as well as choice sets and prices.
Identi…cation
In a model in which certain product characteristics receive more weight than others, identi…cation of underlying utility is likely to be di¢ cult. It is easy to see that such a measure is not non-parametrically identi…ed. Is a product popular because it contains a bundle of popular characteristics or because its good characteristics are particularly salient to consumers in the context? The literature suggests a number of solutions to this problem. While some papers rely of documenting dominated decisions or modelling things that directly a¤ect utility, like switching costs (Handel 2012), other papers rely on restrictions from theory (Abaluck and Gruber 2012).
In our context, we can identify how standardization changes decision weights from one context to another; it does not allow us to identify context-free fundamental utility parameters. More formally, let jP re be the decision index of a plan with characteristics X j pre-standardization and jP ost be the decision index of a plan with the same characteristics, but post-standardization. Our discrete choice model measures jP re = X j P re and jP ost = X j P ost , but cannot separately identify the vectors ; P ost ; and P re : Hence, we normalize P re = 1; and identify (the valuation of characteristics pre-standardization) and P ost (the change in valuation post-standardization).
Identifying P ost requires some additional assumptions, which are likely to be valid in our context. First, there cannot be di¤erential measurement error across the two years of data. The characteristics we measure (such as brand and metal dummies) cannot have increased or decreased in value: bronze plans must be equally generous across the two regimes. This is likely to be satis…ed, as the post-standardization plans were often modelled after prestandardization plans. Second, there can be no heteroskedasticity that requires rescaling of the coe¢ cients (see Train 2003) . In our example, these assumptions are likely to be satis…ed. However, our welfare calculations (below) will consider robustness checks that loosen these assumptions (at the cost of separate identi…cation).
Estimates
The results are in Table 3 . We estimate conditional logit speci…cations in columns 1 and 2, which allow for heterogeneity in based on age, but not further heterogeneity in decision weights. Then, in columns 3 and 4, we estimate a mixed logit speci…cation, in which is allowed to take on a log-normal distribution, so that demographically-identical individuals in a given year vary in how much weight they put on premiums. The estimated standard deviation on the premium coe¢ cient is substantial and statistically signi…cant, and so we prefer the mixed logit estimates in column 4.
In general, we …nd evidence that standardization increased price sensitivity only very slightly. In columns 1 and 2, we …nd that the premium coe¢ cient gets more negative, a di¤erence of about 5%. In column 4, the premium coe¢ cient 0 s estimated mean and standard deviation is similar both pre-and post-standardization; in column 3 the mean is similar, but the standard deviation is somewhat larger post-standardization. The simpler conditional logit speci…cations …nd somewhat lower premium coe¢ cients. You can also see relative changes in the valuation of tiers (bronze is the comparison category): HDHPs receive more negative weight post standardization, and the di¤erences between silver/gold plans and bronze plans increases post-standardization. Table 4 presents the results of a more structured estimation. We constrain the multiplicative change in decision weight to be the same with in groups of characteristics. Speci…cation 1 gives the baseline model, in which decision weights are constrained to be the same pre-and post-standardization. Speci…cation 2 shows that, holding the weight on brand constant, the premium is slightly more salient to consumers (a of 1.02), while …nancial characteristics, including plan tier and the HDHP dummy, are much more salient to consumers (a of 2.02). The full model (speci…cation 3) shows the e¤ect standardization had on the value of brands, which represent both network breadth and …rm reputation. The coe¢ cient on brand is much lower than one (0.70), indicating brand quality became less important post-standardization Again, …nancial characteristics become more important, and premium has roughly the same impact on choices pre-and post-standardization.
The estimates in both Table 3 and Table 4 make an implicit normalization: the variance of the idiosyncratic error term " ij remains constant pre-and post-standardization. Appendix Table A .1 takes an alternative normalization, holding constant the vector ; and estimating how the variance of the error term changes; in this case, the variance of " ij declines from 1 to about 0.7 to 0.8.
The salience model can also be translated into consumer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for various product characteristics. For example, consider the WTP for a gold plan (as opposed to a bronze plan): in 2009, this can be calculated as the coe¢ cient on gold divided by the price sensitivity. This calculation implies that the average consumer in 2009 is WTP $81/month for a gold (rather than bronze) plan. By contrast, to obtain the same number for 2010, we need to multiply the gold coe¢ cient by the for …nancial characteristics of 1.83 and divide by the new price sensitivity. This calculation implies that the average consumer in 2010 in 2010 is WTP $149/month for a gold (rather than bronze) plan. This corresponds to an increase in the popularity of gold plans in the latter year.
Counterfactuals
Introduction
In order to conduct counterfactual simulations, we model …rm prices in two ways: 1) using a hedonic pricing model, and 2) using an equilibrium pricing model. In the hedonic model, we estimate the premium attached to plans'attributes both pre and post-standardization. For instance, we estimate that the list price of a silver plan is $126 more expensive than a bronze plan pre-standardization, and an $114 more expensive post-standardization. Thus, when we simulate …rms'pre-standardization pricing levels on post-standardization plans, we simply apply the estimated pre-standardization hedonic pricing model to the post-standardization plans. The full model is described in the online appendix.
In the equilibrium pricing model, we assume the observed prices are optimal in each year, given the demand that …rms face in that year. We then use our demand estimates to infer what …rms' cost of providing each plan is. Then, when we simulate …rms' prestandardization pricing levels on post-standardization plans, we use our implied cost for the post-standardization plans, and derive the optimal price for those plans if the …rm was to face pre-standardization demand curves.
There are advantages and disadvantage of each pricing model. The disadvantage of the equilibrium pricing model is that if costs in general rise from 2009 to 2010, we will incorporate that in our simulations, so that the exact same plan could be priced di¤erently. The advantage of the equilibrium pricing model is that, because demand di¤ers pre-and poststandardization, it will models how …rms would have actually set prices if they introduced these plans in the other time period. The hedonic pricing model makes no assumptions about costs or …rm policies, but also fails to capture the impact of strategic interaction.
Impact of Standardization on Choice
We …rst run a counterfactual experiment that attempts to disentangle the supply-and demand-side forces that explain changes in market shares across plans. We focus on the number of consumers choosing bronze policies. Using the model estimated in Table 4 (speci…cation 3), we simulate the percentage of consumers choosing bronze plans pre and post-standardization, using both old and new price vectors. To be precise, in the …rst two columns, we simulate choices using the pre-standardization decision weights ( ) and choice set, under either the 2010 or 2009 price vectors. In the second two columns, we use the poststandardization decision weights ( P ost ) and choice set, again under each price vector. Table 5 shows the results. The change in premiums contribute little to the change in 13 choices, however the shift in decision weights makes a large di¤erence. In the …rst two columns, we see that under either set of prices, consumers purchase bronze plans approximately 64% of the time. The second column shows that, under either set of prices, consumers purchase bronze plans only 55% of the time. The roughly 10% fall in the market share of bronze plans is due to demand-side factors, rather than …rm pricing or the choice set.
The E¤ect of Standardization on Welfare
Did standardization on the HIX improve welfare and make consumers better o¤? We present our estimates of the change in consumer welfare in Table 6 . In order to assess welfare, we need a welfare criterion. We rely on revealed preference, but present welfare using two di¤erent welfare criteria, U pre and U post ; since we estimate di¤erent preferences pre-and post-standardization. Fortunately, these di¤erent welfare criteria give similar results; in the welfare framework of Bernheim and Rangel (2012), one cannot rank the inconsistent choices.
In our evaluation of welfare, we put aside the any e¤ect of increasing the number of options in the choice set. Recall that there are actually more plans post-standardization than pre-standardization. Our welfare analyses hold the number of plans …xed, choosing the 25 most popular plans in 2010 to compare to the 25 plans in 2009. Thus, we potentially underestimate the positive e¤ects of standardization on welfare.
For each welfare criterion w 2 fpre; postg, we measure equivalent variation using the standard formula of Nevo (2001) and McFadden (1999) , which is given by:
where j = w p j + X j w is the estimated mean utility of plan j; which can decomposed into the disutility of price w p j and the positive utility of plan characteristics (or …xed e¤ects) X j w : Note that the coe¢ cients have subscripts w; since they will di¤er depending on the welfare criterion used Row 1 presents our estimate of the total e¤ect of standardization on welfare, which includes a shift in menu, premiums, and consumer decision weights. Using either welfare criterion, we …nd that standardization improved welfare by 15% percent of premiums (or about $50-100/enrollee per month).
We then decompose increase in welfare into components using counterfactual simulations. First we examine the e¤ect of prices for plans, which di¤ered pre and post standardization. We want to set aside the e¤ect of cost increases that result from either medical in ‡ation or from changes in …rms'pricing power (markups). Thus, in Row 2 we evaluate welfare under a standardization event that (counterfactually) held prices constant at pre-standardization levels-that is, a simulation in which, were a plan to be o¤ered in the identical form preand post-standardization, it would have the price. The simulation, therefore, does allow for changes in prices that result from changes in plan generosity. Thus, we use the EV w formula above, but plug in the counterfactual prices at the pre-standardization level:p pre j : Here, we …nd that standardization would have increased welfare even more if price levels had remained constant: at total increase of 10% using hedonic pricing (about $400/enrollee-year) or 5% using equilibrium pricing (about $200/enrollee-year). The results of the constant pricing simulations imply that changes in …rms'premiums capture part of the surplus that results from standardization: the e¤ect of standardization is only 25% as large (equilibrium pricing) or 40-60% as large (hedonic pricing). From this result, we conclude that "nudges" that a¤ect consumer behavior are also likely to a¤ect equilibrium outcomes as …rms respond to changing consumer demand.
Experiment
The standardization on the Massachusetts HIX involved 2 changes. First-and most importantlythe choice set changed. Second, the choice interface changed. Recall that post-standardization, plans within the same sub-tier had identical …nancial characteristics-this is the change in the choice menu. However, this change also enabled a change in the choice interface: instead of choosing a plan from the list of plans available 11 , post-standardization enrollees …rst chose a tier of insurance generosity, and then chose an insurer. In addition, slightly di¤erent information was displayed pre versus post-standardization.
We conduct an experiment to examine the extent to which standardization had an effect through a) the change in choice menu versus b) the change in choice interface. The experiment disassociates these two changes. We assign participants to one of three conditions: The "Pre-Stdz." condition replicated the HIX's pre-standardization choice menu and interface, while the "Post-Stdz." condition replicated the HIX's post-standardization choice menu and interface. The third condition, "Alt-Post." has exactly the same plans as in the "Post-Standardization" condition, but uses the pre-standardization decision interface (plans are presented in a list, and characteristics of plans were presented as they were in the pre-standardization interface). Comparing Pre-Stdz. to Post-Stdz. choices allows us to establish the validity our experimental design (and the validity of our analysis of the HIX data). Comparing Post-Stdz. choices to choices in the counterfactual Alt-Post condition allows us to examine the extent to whether the observed shifts in choice or due to the menu or the interface.
We recruited participants from an online panel (run by the …rm Qualtrics) who roughly matched the demographics of individuals purchasing insurance on the HIX: they lived in one of these northeastern states (ME, VT, NH, MA, CT, RI, and NY), and had relatively high household incomes ($35k+ for an individual or $65k+ for a family of four). Participants answered some demographic questions. They were then assigned to a condition, and asked to pick the insurance plan they preferred. This is our primary variable of interest. After making their choice, participants were asked to rate the salience of various plan characteristics. They were then shown another choice menu, and asked to make a second choice, and then asked to rate the salience of various plan characteristics in this second menu.
We …rst examine the reduced form e¤ect of the various conditions. Our hypothesis of interest in not the levels chosen in our experiments, but in di¤erences between conditions. Examining the actual choices on the HIX (Table 1) , we make predictions for the comparison of choices in the Pre-Stdz and Post-Stdz conditions. Although there are many di¤erences between observed choices in 2009 and 2010, we focus our hypotheses on the three largest e¤ect sizes (>10 percentage point di¤erences) seen in the actual HIX data. Our hypotheses are that standardization should: H1: Reduce the fraction of participants choosing high deductible health plans (HDHP) H2: Increase the market share of Neighborhood Health Plan H3: Decrease the market share of Fallon
We have three additional weaker hypotheses (shifts in choice between 5 and 10 percentage points): standardization should decrease the fraction of bronze plans chosen, increase the fraction silver plans chosen, and increase the market share of Tufts Health Plan. Table 7 shows the summary statistics for the experiment, by condition. First, note that experimental participants choose more generous plans than observed in the actual HIX. There are many potential explanations for this, including selection into the exchange; Ericson and Starc (2012) show that choices on the HIX are less generous than observed in employersponsored insurance. The distribution of brand choices is similar between the actual data and the observed data, with the biggest exception is that Tufts is relatively more popular among the experimental participants. (Note that we intentionally chose a geographic region in which the smallest insurer, Health New England, was not o¤ered.)
The treatment e¤ects in the experiment verify all three predictions, even though the baseline levels of choice di¤er between the experiment and the actual data. In the Post-Stdz. condition, the fraction choosing HDHP drops by 16 percentage points, the market share of Neighborhood Health Plan increases by 17 percentage points, and the market share of Fallon drops by 4 percentage points. (All these di¤erences are signi…cant with p < 0:01:) Similarly, we …nd small directional support (though statistically insigni…cant) for a decrease in bronze and an increase silver plans. The only shift we do not replicate was the market share of Tufts Health Plan: experimental participants were slightly less likely to choose Tufts in the Post-Stdz. condition, while HIX enrollees were slightly more likely to choose Tufts post-standardization; this may be an artefact of the high rate of preference for Tufts among experimental participants. Appendix Table A .8 veri…es these results using a regression framework; controlling for demographics alters point estimates of di¤erences only slightly, but improves precision. Appendix Table A .9 runs conditional and mixed logit choice models on the experimental data-analogous to 3. It …nds many similar shifts in decision weights: an increase post-standardization in valuation of the gold tier (relative to bronze) and the disutility from HDHP plans. However. we do not …nd a sign…cant age trend in premiums, and valuation of silver tiered plans increases post-standardization only in the mixed logit speci…cation. Finally, we …nd an increase in price sensitivity post-standardization in the conditional logits, larger than that found in the actual HIX data.
These results show that hypothetical choice experiments can replicate actual behavior, and add to a growing literature validating such experiments in the health insurance context (Kuzeimko and Krueger 2013 , Kesternich et al. 2013 , Ericson and Kessler 2013 . The experiment's results indicates con…rms the validity of our design analyzing the actual HIX data, providing evidence that observed shift in choices was due to standardization, rather than some other factor (e.g. a shift in enrollee composition).
The counterfactual condition "Alt.-Post" uses the post-standardization menu with the pre-standardization choice interface. There are only small di¤erences in the brands chosen, comparing this condition to the Post-Stdz. condition. However, the alternative interface leads experimental participants to make more extreme choices than in the Post-Stdz. condition: Alt.-Post participants are both more likely to choose a gold plan and more likely to choose a HDHP plan than Post-Stdz. participants. This is consistent with the poststandardization interface enabling consumers to di¤erentiate among plans in a more accurate way; it can be di¢ cult to di¤erentiate among plans in a long list, and individuals may gravitate toward one end or another. Note that the change in interface in complementary to the change in choice menu, as the post-standardization interface simpli…cations would not have been possible without the concurrent change in the choice menu.
After participants made their choice in from their assigned menu, we asked them to rate "how important" various factors were in making their choice on a scale of 1-7 (not at all important to extremely important). Table 8 gives means by condition (Appendix Table A .9 shows that results are unchanged controlling for covariates). The most important category is, unsuprisingly, premium with a rating of about 6.0, with the following categories close behind (5.4 to 5.8): cost of hospital stay, cost of a doctor's visit, deductible and "maximum out of pocket expense". Tier was rated the least important dimesion for all three conditionswhile it may have been useful in organizing information, individuals seemed to rely …nancial characteristics of plans.
These importance ratings were a¤ected by condition: standardization increased the importance of tiers relative to the other characteristics of plans. The regression point estimates indicate that the measured importance of every other listed attribute declined, except brand. However, these results show that the increase in the importance of tier came primarily from the interface redesign, rather than the choice menu. The Post-Alt condition did not show any signi…cant change in the importance of tier, as compared to the Pre-Stdz. condition. This suggests that theories of salience that only rely on the attributes of choice (rather than how they are presented) miss important elements of salience.
Two additional factors were related as less important in the Post-Stdz. condition, as compared to Pre-Stdz.: cost of hospital stay and maximum out of pocket expense. Both were surprising: ex ante, hospital stay seems equally prominent in both conditions. Moreover, only in the Post-Stdz. condition was information about maximum annual out-of-pocket cost directly listed. One hypothesis is that participants interpreted "maximum annual out of pocket expense" as referring to their subjective assessment of the total risk they would face in the plan, and that in the Post-Stdz. condition they relied more on tier instead. Finally, neither brand nor tier varied in importance across the three conditions. This result is consistent with our discrete choice models estimated on the actual HIX data, which did not …nd an increase in price sensitivity post standardization.
Discussion
Given that, in many scenarios, standardization improves outcomes for consumers and …rms can capture some of the newly generated surplus, there is an open question of why they did not o¤er such an assortment of plans initially. We believe that this is due to the central role of information provision in shaping consumer choice. However, other explanations for insurer behavior are equally plausible. The …rst, …rm learning, argues that the market simply may not be in equilibrium yet. The market is relatively new (approximately 4 years old at the end of our sample period) and that may not have been enough time for …rms to learn about both costs and demand. Demand will obviously a¤ect pricing (see Ericson and Starc 2012) as well as product o¤erings. Furthermore, as we explore below, …rms may also need to know about the nature of selection. Finally, given that this may be a relatively small proportion of a insurer's book of business, they may not have a huge incentive to perfect their o¤erings in this particular market.
Second, regulation has a large impact on the o¤erings of …rms in many insurance markets, and especially in this insurance market. In some sense, this is a paper about improved regulation via information provision. Initially, …rms were told to submit just two bids for bronze plans. They were to be of the same basic design, with one having prescription drug coverage and one omitting prescription drug coverage (the latter were later abandoned). Underlying this logic was the idea that consumers, contrary to economists, may actually prefer less choice, so that they don't have to compare "apples to lava" (cite: Toolkit Series). Given this view, the standardization may have improved welfare by introducing additional choice while providing additional decision support tools that allowed them to express their preferences. Therefore, it may be the interaction of the choice set and the information provision that led to gains in consumer surplus.
A third possibility is that selection led to the product assortment in the pre-standardization period. It is possible that a low-deductible Neighborhood bronze plan would have attracted a very high cost subset of the population and would not have been pro…table. However, it then seems interesting that BCBS would o¤er such a plan, given that sicker consumers would be drawn to their more extensive network and stronger brand name. Regardless, this highlights the fact that one-shot deviations may or may not be pro…table. As a case-inpoint, we estimate that the Neighborhood Bronze High plan, which captures a 16% market share in 2010, would capture roughly half that number of consumers, or an 8% market share, under the 2009 preferences.
Finally, we note that the policy change was not without risk. In the bottom panel of Table 5 , we see that if the insurers were forced to o¤er only one plan of each medalbronze, silver, and gold -the consumers are made worse o¤ under the 2010 prices regardless of their preferences. Therefore, this type of policy intervention requires caution. Without expanding the choice set and providing a high-value option to consumers, the policy change could have reduced welfare.
Conclusion
We analyze a real-world change in "choice architecture" and examine its e¤ect on consumers. In 2010, the Massachusetts Connector standardized the policies available to consumers and changed the way information was presented. We argue that the change altered the decision weights consumers attached to multiple product characteristics. In this market, consumers trade-o¤ …nancial and network generosity o¤ against premiums. The change in "choice architecture" made …nancial generosity more salient and network generosity less salient to consumers. As a result, post-standardization consumers chose more …nancially generous plans (shifting away from HDHP), while simultaneously opting for insurers with narrower networks. We show that this is due to demand-side, rather than supply-side, factors.
Consistent with the behavioral economics literature, we …nd that well-designed "choice architecture" generates bene…ts for consumers. Depending on the exact speci…cation, consumer welfare increases 13-15% due to the policy change. However, …rms are able to capture some of the surplus associated with the change. Consumer surplus would have been higher in the absence of …rm reoptimization. As a result, we argue that potential choice architects take …rm behavior into account when setting policy. Finally, our experimental results con…rm and extend the empirical exercise. We show that product standardization allows consumers to more accurately di¤erentiate between plans and that changes in the choice set were complementary to changes in the information interface. 2010 Hed. 2009 Hed. 2010 Eqm. 2009 Eqm. 2009 2009 2009 -190.09 -194.786 -316.206 -194.786 2009 2009 2010 -215.355 -219.107 -362.346 -219.107 2010 2009 2009 -206.482 -210.54 -342.183 -210.54 2010 2009 2010 -188.571 -191.861 -319.186 -191.861 2010 2010 2010 -161.612 -142.816 -161.612 -161.256 2010 2010 2009 -150.346 -133.568 -150.346 -131.603 2009 2010 2010 -159.913 -141.989 -159.913 -150.28 2009 2010 2009 Notes. Island, and New York.) Individuals gave their income, and were screened out of the experiment if their pre-tax household income was below the following thresholds: $35,000 if single, $45,000 for a household of 2, $55,000 for 3, or $65,000 for 4 or more. After answering some demographic questions, participants were assigned to a condition. Participants were divided into two major age groups: over 45 and under 45. Assignment to condition was balanced within age group, and each age group saw di¤erent prices (as prices on the HIX are age-dependent). Participants saw the choice menu (plans and prices) available in zipcode 02130, and saw age 35 prices (if under 45) and age 50 prices (if over age 45). Zipcode 02130 (Jamaica Plain, Mass.) is similar to other zipcodes, with the exception that Health New England was not o¤ered in this area; Health New England has relatively low market share.
Participants in the Pre-Stdz. condition simply chose their plan from the list of plans in an interface similar to the HIX's pre-standardization interface. (Compare Figure A After making their choices, participants rated how imporant each of a list of attributes was for their decision, on a scale of 1-7. Then, participants made an additional choice in a di¤erent condition: participants in the Pre-Stdz. condition made their second choice in the Post-Stdz. condition, while participants in both the Post-Stdz. and Alt-Post conditions A.8 
